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JAMES Q. WHITMAN*
The Hunt for Truth in Comparative Lawt
In this response to Pierre Legrand's dense and provocative account
of my differences with James Gordley, I express some gratitude for
Professor Legrand's kindness, ome dismay at his account of Gordley,
some uneasiness about the use of literary theory in comparative law,
and not least my admiration for Legrand's deft and inventive writing.
While I gladly acknowledge that there is a kinship between his atti-
tude toward scholarship and my own, I insist that I have by no means
given up on the hunt for truth.
INTRODUCTION
I feel at a loss for words. Who would not feel at a loss for words
after being plunged into Pierre Legrand's dizzying torrent of word-
play, and after hearing his somewhat disorienting praise? My first
instinct is to distance myself from much of what he writes, since
I have always been put off by the sort of literary theory he exploits. (I
began my intellectual career in comparative literature, not compara-
tive law-and fled.) I am not sure how much sense it makes to think
of law as a "text," and I worry that comparative law will lose its audi-
ence if it indulges in language that is too dense and baffling. Legrand
also leaves me feeling more than little indignant on behalf of my
friend Gordley, whose portrayal in his article strikes me as ungra-
cious and unfair.
Still, whatever my doubts, I have to say that Legrand's article,
with its acrobatics and its subversive account of the sociology of
scholarship, strikes me as a classic in the genre, undoubtedly the
best piece of work of the kind that we will ever see in the field. And
I have to admit that he has gotten me right in many respects. At
least I think so. In any case, I am glad for the chance to revisit my
differences with Gordley.
I.
Let me begin, though, with why I feel indignant on Gordley's
behalf. Here I must do my best to translate Legrand's dizzying
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argument into my own more pedestrian idiom. Legrand, as I read
him, writes in the spirit of the shrewd French anthropologist and
social critic Pierre Bourdieu. That is to say, he portrays the academic
discourse of comparative law as an integral element in the institu-
tional sociology of the field, and he portrays that institutional soci-
ology as a kind of system for the production of "distinction"-of the
sort of social honor that Bourdieu writes about so perceptively.1 The
world of comparative law, on Legrand's account, is something like
the world captured in group photos of provincial learned societies
of the nineteenth century: It is a stuffy world, fond of vacuous hon-
ors. The stuffiness and vacuity of the academic social order produces,
and is reproduced in, a stuffiness and vacuity of the academic mind.
The fondness for honors in this world is central to its workings.
Comparative lawyers like to confer awards on each other for their
"scientific" advances. Yet their supposed "science" is a sort of gibber-
ish, best suited to being lampooned by a Rudolf von Jhering, or even
better by Gilbert and Sullivan or L. Frank Baum. James Gordley is a
product of the ills of this world. James Whitman by contrast defies it.
Whitman writes rude reviews that poke fun at the sociology of hon-
ors and raises fundamental doubts about the value of the supposed
"science" of comparative law.
There may be some truth in all this, but first things first: There
is nothing stuffy or vacuous about the man James Gordley, and noth-
ing stuffy or vacuous about his work. His career, and his life in the
law, cannot by any means be explained by reference to the academic
sociology of honors. On the contrary, Gordley has done considerably
more to defy the system of honors than Whitman has. The sociology
of academic distinction in the American legal academy has to do first
and foremost with the cursed rankings of the U.S. News & World
Report. Gordley cheerfully descended a number of rungs in those
rankings in order to join a faculty where he could lead a more ful-
filling and companionable intellectual existence. There are not many
scholars in America who make such choices. It is perfectly reasonable
to disagree with Gordley's idea of the science of the law but unfair
nonsense to think of him as anything but a man ready to lose himself
completely in the life of the mind. People like Gordley are a treasure,
and there are far too few of them.
As for James Whitman: I hunger for honors, undoubtedly more
than Gordley does. I certainly enjoy seeing articles go into print
praising me! In that sense, Legrand has me wrong. But he has cor-
rectly noted an unfortunate truth about me: I have indeed writ-
ten rude reviews-the worst of them, the review of the admirable
Patrick Glenn from which Legrand reproduces some painful quotes.
I am glad to have this chance to say how much I regret having put
1. See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU, LA DISTINCTION: CRITIQUE SOCIALE DU JUGEMENT
(1979).
182 [Vol. 65
THE HUNT FOR TRUTH IN COMPARATIVE LAW
it into print. I hoped it would remain buried. It is nasty nonsense.
I think I wrote it for two reasons. First, my review appeared in the
Rechtshistorisches Journal, a publication that at the time encour-
aged a culture of mockery, into which I should not have allowed
myself to be drawn. Second, I envied the courage of Glenn in tack-
ling the immense subject of Legal Traditions of the World, and like
other envious people, I wrote something spiteful. I will only say in
my defense that I did make an effort to discuss methodological ques-
tions in that review as well, in parts that Legrand does not choose
to quote.
So I do not think that the biographies either of James Gordley
or James Whitman make good cases for the Bourdieuian sociol-
ogy I take Legrand to be proposing. On the contrary, his use of our
names leaves me alternately incensed and ashamed. At the same
time, I fully recognize that the test of a sociological account is never
whether it correctly describes every individual case, and I am more
than ready to salute Legrand for proposing it. Of course, he must be
right, on some level of generality, that academic life involves a great
deal of mutual citation, stroking, and congratulation. Yes, he must
be right that we should shake off our belief that we are in pursuit
of a "truth" that can be understood outside of the institutional con-
text of the discipline that produces it. Maybe he, like me, writes a bit
in a spirit of resentment and spite, but he has managed to turn his
resentment and spite into authentic insight. That is something that
does not come along very often.
II.
Let me now move on to my understanding of my differences with
Gordley, and to what is right, what is doubtful, and what is insight-
ful in Legrand's account of it. Legrand treats Gordley as a "positivist"
who is "actively working toward the preservation of the established
epistemic order."2 That is not how I would describe him. I see Gordley
as a man who belongs to a grand juristic tradition that draws heav-
ily on the methods of philosophy, and especially on the methods of
Aristotelean philosophy. The working assumption of this tradition is
that we-and the "we" includes persons of good will from every era
and every clime-can reflect together on the common problems of
humankind. In particular, we can reflect together on problems in law
and hope to come to common agreement on what is right and just.
The sorts of problems that preoccupy Gordley are in particular the
presumptively universal ones of the core subjects that are customar-
ily taught in the first year or two of legal education-in American
terms the problems of tort, contract, and basic criminal law. These
2. Pierre Legrand, Jameses at Play: A Tractation on the Comparison of Laws, 65
Am. J. COMP. L. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 13 (2017).
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are domains of the law that typically analyze transactions between
two parties that pose problems that lend themselves to analysis
using the basic tools of moral philosophy: Should persons be bound
by their promises? When should they be held to account for the harm
they do to others? Because these domains involve what are arguably
basic moral problems that are common to all mankind, they seem
to call for a scholarship founded in moral universalism. Gordley
believes that there are ultimately right answers to such problems,
3
just as Aristotle believed that there is a right way to order human
society. He believes that if you sit thoughtful people down in a room
together and present them with the basic questions of the law, there
is good reason to hope that they will arrive at agreement about the
answers.4 It is precisely the long work over the ages to establish
those right answers that has produced the law.
Now, Gordley's view of the law seems to me honorable and beau-
tiful; in some sense I am for it, but in the end, I think it is hopeless.
My objection, however, is not that Gordley is too "positivistic," or too
committed to "the established epistemic order."5 To say such things is
to misjudge his mind, and his sense of mission. Gordley is a philoso-
pher, and an idealist in more than one sense of the word. He believes
that the law has a just form that is at best imperfectly realized in
the world we live in today.6 That sort of philosophical idealism has
nothing to do with positivism. From Gordley's point of view, it would
be a thorough mistake to accept the positivistic notion that the only
law that has authority is the law as it exists on the books today. The
"law" is something that we are striving to find, not something that
can be looked up mechanically in a law library. Gordley's attitude
toward the law, if I understand it correctly, is thus about as remote
from banal law-office positivism as it gets. In fact, Gordley is much
less of a positivist than I am. I take pleasure in grubbing around
in the nuts and bolts of contemporary law on topics that I think
Gordley must regard as mere juristic detritus-law on law-office top-
ics like pharmaceutical regulation, credit reporting, or vacations. To
me these are topics that are both amusing in themselves and reveal-
ing about the human world that has produced them. Gordley thinks
of the law as a subject for fundamental moral reflection, not as a
source of amusement about the human condition, and he is deter-
mined to look beyond the detritus of this world to see deeper truths.
Beautiful indeed, but to my mind hopeless-but not, once again,
because it is "positivistic." Gordley's aspirations for the law simply
3. I put the accent here on "ultimately." See Gordley's careful and extremely
thoughtful account, acknowledging the complexities in realizing the "principles" of
the law, in James Gordley, The Universalist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES:
TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 31 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003).
4. See id.
5. Legrand, supra note 3.
6. See Gordley, supra note 4.
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seem to me to rest on a considerable overestimation of human capac-
ities. The human world, as I see it, is much too immense, much too
varied, and much too much prey to contingency to permit the confi-
dent search for "the" law. The point was made beautifully by Patrick
Glenn, with his call for "sustainable legal diversity in law.7 Human
beings are too attached to beliefs and convictions that they have
absorbed during their daily lives-beliefs and convictions that they
have no energy to question, and that outsiders are rarely entitled to
deem either right or wrong. The world is not a philosophy seminar
room, or even a courtroom, and it is simply not the case that people
of good will can be expected to arrive at the same answers, or even
to perceive the world as throwing up the same questions. It is mis-
leading to focus on the relatively simple and often stylized problems
presented by the basic law courses in tort, contract, and criminal
law. People, especially people brought up in the western tradition,
often share inherited intuitions about basic morality that make
it more likely that they will take similar views. But even in those
areas there are dramatic differences among contemporary western
legal cultures-differences that seem manifestly rooted in broader
cultural dispositions. The differences, like all differences in human
affairs, are partly the result of historical contingencies, which must
be traced.
Our debate over privacy law, highlighted by Legrand, is indeed a
fine example of our clashing views. Gordley, echoing the accounts of
a distinguished line of European jurists, takes a majestic view of the
law, describing a great juristic conversation over the problem of pri-
vacy that extends at least as far back as the Roman jurists on injuria
and includes not only French and German jurists of the nineteenth
century, but also the eminent Americans Warren and Brandeis. He
acknowledges that the law differs from country to country, and espe-
cially as between continental Europe and the United States, and
somewhat more broadly the common law world. Nevertheless, he
sees large areas of agreement-after all, the Warren and Brandeis
tort has occasionally been recognized by American courts; perhaps
the recent Hulk Hogan affair suggests that it may come back to
life, at least in the most egregious cases;" meanwhile, the English
courts are shifting gears under the pressure of the Human Rights
Act.9 Gordley wonders what could possibly bar an ongoing conversa-
tion about the law of privacy that will allow all of us to learn from
7. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSiTY IN LAW
(5th ed. 2014).
8. See, e.g., Nick Madigan, Jury Tacks on $25 Million to Gawker's Bill in Hulk
Hogan Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/business/
media/hulk-hogan-damages-25-million-gawker-case.html.
9. See, e.g., Basil Markesinis, Colm O'Cinneide, Jbrg Fedtke & Myriam Hunter-
Henin, Concerns and Ideas about the Developing English Law of Privacy (And How
Knowledge of Foreign Law Might Be of Help), 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 133 (2004).
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each other.10 Why should we say that the law differs, rather than
saying that we have differences over the law that can ultimately be
reconciled?
Unsurprisingly, I see the obstacles to finding the right answer as
running deeper. This is partly because, like Glenn, I do not believe
that there need be a single right answer. There are a few issues on
which it seems imperative that the world should speak with a sin-
gle voice-the ban on genocide is the obvious example-but they are
very few indeed, and for the most part they are issues that must be
dealt with by means other than law, in particular by means of war
and diplomacy. When it comes to the ordinary stuff of daily life, it
is perfectly acceptable, and in fact desirable, that the legal orders of
the world should differ-that for example the contract law of differ-
ent western countries, closely related though they are, should differ
in ways that contribute to the making of different sorts of economic
ordering.1
The comparative law of privacy shows particularly dramati-
cally how deeply these closely related countries differ, and in ways
that suggest deep divergences in our underlying perceptions of
the demands of justice. The differences do not just have to do with
classic private law problems: It is not merely the case that we dif-
fer over what should be done if Party A tortiously violates the "pri-
vacy" (whatever precisely that is) of Party B. They also have to do
with a host of modern legislative and judicial programs, touching
on areas as fundamental to the organization of modern society as
credit reporting. Year after year new conflicts break out, including
most recently conflicts over the "right to be forgotten"'2 and the per-
missibility of the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Agreement.3 Vast sums and
great decisions in foreign policy depend on how we resolve, or fail to
resolve, these differences. It is impossible to understand our conflicts
unless we recognize that they are rooted in clashing, and ultimately
irreconcilable, conceptions of what "privacy" involves. And while it is
perfectly possible for individual Americans to prefer the European
approach and vice versa, it is exceedingly unlikely that we will all
sit down together and agree on what "the law" requires: Prevailing
10. See James Gordley, When is the Use of Foreign Law Possible? A Hard Case:
The Protection of Privacy in Europe and the United States, 67 LA. L. REV. 1073, 1099
(2006-2007).
11. See, e.g., Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of
Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE
ADVANTAGE 1, 26-27 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001); Aditi Bagchi, The
Political Economy of Regulating Contract, 62 AM. J. COMp. L. 687 (2014).
12. For a conflict that never seems to end, see for example, Mark Scott, Google
Appeals French Privacy Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.
com/2016/05/20/technology/google-appeals-french-privacy-ruling.html?ref=world.
13. See, e.g., Duncan Robinson, EU and US Reach Deal on Data Sharing,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7a9954d2-c9c8-11e5-
be0b-b7ece4e953aO.html#axzz3z6oZIoAp.
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perceptions of the sorts of rights that are endangered by modern
life differ too much on either side of the Atlantic-and there is no
principle of moral philosophy that condemns the existence of such
differences.
Gordley thinks that we can find an ultimate measure of truth
and justice; I think that while such an undertaking might be possible
for God, it is certainly not possible for Man. That is the core of our
dispute, but there is more to it as well. I subscribe to the widespread
American belief that "the law" should be understood as the law in
action. We cannot content ourselves with the bare text of the law but
must understand how the law is applied in practice. Because Gordley
values the deliberations of jurists so much, he thinks of "the law" as
something whose working materials are found in the reasoned texts
that the jurists produce. Because I am primarily concerned with the
law in action, I am more inclined than Gordley to read between the
lines, hunting for hints of taken-for-granted assumptions.14 I am
also more inclined to spend time sifting through commentaries on
code language, as well, of course, as case law.15 Our debate over the
law of privacy has been conducted partly across this familiar divide
between those who study law on the books and those who study the
law in action.
Our debate also reflects our clashing views over the place of his-
torical contingency in human affairs. I hold to the historicist credo
of figures like the theologian Ernst Troeltsch: Human beings live in
their historical moment, and there is little expectation that they can
ever fully escape it. We are certainly entitled to believe, as Troeltsch
did, that there are ultimate truths,16 and it should be our mission as
scholars to reflect critically and creatively on the values of the soci-
eties we study. In the end, though, scholars are condemned to live
in a world of an irreducible, and constantly shifting, variety in val-
ues.17 Certainly the overwhelming bulk of humanity lives out unre-
flective lives that rest on taken-for-granted assumptions produced
over generations of unexamined experience. We are all, scholars and
laypeople alike, captives of the historical moment in which we find
ourselves.
The account of the comparative law of privacy that I offer is
an account of that sort of historical contingency. It begins in the
mid-eighteenth century, as old status categories began their
14. Looking beyond the text of the codes seems to me especially important when
we trace questions of social hierarchy, since western law has largely been framed,
misleadingly, in terms of formal equality; this is one of the most significant legacies
of Roman law. See James Q. Whitman, Long Live the Hatred of Roman Law!, 2003
RECHTSGESCHICHTE 40 (2003).
15. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies,
109 YALE L. J. 1279, 1323 (2000).
16. See Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme, in 3 GESAMMELTE
SCHRIFTEN 2 (1922).
17. See id. at 694-730.
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epochal western shift toward new patterns of egalitarianism, and
it is emphatically about what has happened over the succeeding
couple of centuries in the western world, not about universalities
of the human experience. There is little room for historical contin-
gency in Gordley's account, of course, and his critique of my argu-
ment revolves largely around the assertion that what I say about
the law in action as it emerged in the turbulent centuries after
1750 or so is not true of the reasoning of the jurists of Antiquity
or the Middle Ages.i" Needless to say, I think that critique misses
the mark.
Such are my differences with Gordley as I understand them:
They are fundamentally differences over the human predicament
that yield differences over how to practice comparative law.
CONCLUSION
So how close is my reading of the Whitman/Gordley debate
to Legrand's? Legrand certainly shares my historicism.19 But for
the most part, if I understand him correctly, he pitches his argu-
ment in a different key. To Legrand, the debate turns on the ques-
tion of whether "the law" has any sort of stable meaning. His "James
Gordley" imagines that there can be some sort of encounter between
the human mind and the text of the law that yields a definitive
meaning to be determined through positivistic reading.20 His "James
Whitman" believes that the text of the law can never be reduced to a
single meaning.21 This is partly because text is inextricably interwo-
ven with culture, but also partly because different minds will always
see different truths in the text. For that reason, Legrand celebrates
my use of the first-person singular, which bespeaks the ultimately
monadic and infinitely variable nature of the encounter of minds
with the law.
Now I resist a great deal of this interpretation. First of all, to say
it one last time, I do not believe that Gordley thinks that the text of
the law conveys a single authoritative truth. In his view, the texts
with which he works are part of ongoing collective effort to find an
ultimate truth that we have not yet succeeded in fully uncovering.
22
Second, I am not ready to accept the proposition that the human
experience of law is easily analogized to the reader's (or the critic's)
experience of a text. There are certainly useful analogies. It seems
to me true enough that no literary author is fully in control of how
his text is created or how it is received. In much the same way, no
18. See, e.g., Gordley, supra note 10, at 1085-87.
19. See Pierre Legrand, On the Singularity of Law, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 517 (2006).
20. See Legrand, supra note 3, at 74.
21. See id. at 62.
22. See Gordley, supra note 4.
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"author" of the law is fully in control. It seems to me that ordinary
actors do to some extent respond to the law in ways that resemble
how readers respond to literary texts: There is a kind of romance of
the law that gives it its life in the popular mind. But at the same
time, the law is manifestly shaped by social and economic forces that
are not well described through the techniques of literary theory, and
I would prefer an argument that reckoned more with the limits of
what literary theorists have to offer.
As for the first person singular: I certainly agree that the hunt
for ultimate truth is destined to fail, but I am not prepared to con-
cede that we cannot arrive at lesser degrees of truth, and proba-
bly more by way of lesser truth than Legrand believes. My use of
the first person singular does indeed personalize my account to
some extent. I believe, to adopt the language of nineteenth-century
German hermeneutics, that understanding of a foreign time or
place requires a practice of Einfiihlung, of empathetic understand-
ing, that must inevitably be conducted by the individual scholar.
There is no way to understand an alien culture without throw-
ing oneself into it. But that does not mean that individual empa-
thetic interpretations are purely arbitrary. There is a test of the
truth of what the individual scholar says: That test is whether his
descriptions seem right and plausible to others who know the cul-
tures he describes, and whether they seem to make sense of what
would otherwise be confusing phenomena. Conscientious scholars
must submit themselves to that test: They must present their evi-
dence to others, and they must pay attention when they receive
skeptical responses. Through conversation with others, our conclu-
sions attain a kind of verifiability-though they may never rise
to the level of unimpeachably scientific falsifiability. Of course, it
is our subjectivity that leads us, if we are lucky, to our insights.
Nevertheless, we are bound by what the evidence tells us and by
whether our interpretation of that evidence seems convincing to
intelligent interlocutors.23
The notion that we can attain a measure of truth through
Einfiihlung of this kind may seem hopelessly solipsistic, and thor-
oughly inadequate, to some philosophers of science. Nevertheless,
I believe that it is what humanistic scholars do, and must do;
I believe that the fact that it may be done in a bad, solipsistic way
does not mean that we should not try to do it; and I believe that com-
parative law must be largely a humanistic endeavor, especially when
it comes to topics like privacy-though I also believe that there are
other important approaches, for example in comparative political
economy. Truth-through-Einfiihlung is not the sort of eternal, trans-
cultural truth that Gordley seeks, but I do think that it is truth. In
23. See Arnaldo Momligliano, History in an Age of Ideologies, 51 Am. SCHOLAR 495
(1982).
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particular, I do think that what I have written about western privacy
cultures since the mid-eighteenth century is true, and not just my
idiosyncratic view. If Legrand thinks differently about my work-and
I am not sure whether he does-I protest. But to the extent he is an
advocate, as I am, of humanistic approaches to the inescapable, and
welcome, diversity of the human experience of the law, I embrace his
comradeship.
